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REPLY 
WHY CUSTOM CANNOT SAVE COPYRIGHT’S FAIR USE 
DEFENSE 
Jennifer E. Rothman* 
 want to thank Richard Epstein for his thoughtful comments on 
my article, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Prop-
erty, and the Virginia Law Review for asking me to reply to them.1 
In my underlying article I bring to light the tremendous impact that 
custom has on both de facto and de jure intellectual property 
(“IP”) law, and criticize the general preference of courts to incor-
porate such custom into the law. I set forth reasons why custom is 
of particularly limited value in the IP context. My position is not 
that custom has no relevance to an inquiry of what might be a fair 
or appropriate use of another’s IP. Instead, my position is more 
nuanced. Customs should be considered only for a normative 
proposition—such as what constitutes a fair use—when the specific 
custom was developed in a representative manner, is aspirational 
in nature (rather than simply a litigation-avoidance strategy), is 
applied to represented parties, and where an independent evalua-
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. 
1 This essay is a reply to Richard A. Epstein, Some Reflections on Custom in 
the IP Universe, 93 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 207 (2008), 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2008/01/21/epstein.pdf. The underlying 
article is Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom In Intellectual 
Property, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1899 (2007). 
I 
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tion is made of what impact such a custom would have if broadly 
adopted. 
In his response to my article, Professor Epstein reinforces his de-
fense of the use of custom in the law and suggests that, at least in 
some instances, his position holds true in the context of IP.2 Be-
cause Epstein focuses his response on copyright law and the copy-
right fair use defense, I will generally do the same in this reply. It is 
worth noting, however, that my article sweeps more broadly, con-
sidering customs involving trademarks, patents, and publicity 
rights. 
OPTIMALITY AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
At its heart, our primary disagreement is not about the ideal 
scope of copyright’s fair use defense, but instead centers on what 
role private ordering should play in addressing that legal morass. 
Epstein unquestionably has more faith than I do in industries to 
develop optimal rules independently of judicial or governmental 
oversight. I am particularly skeptical that customs in the IP context 
will develop in an optimal fashion because of market inequalities, 
the complexity of the IP industries, and the dearth of ongoing rela-
tionships and repeat players. In addition, customs have developed 
in the shadow of the highly uncertain fair use rules and the public 
at large has rarely been involved in the development of these cus-
toms. As I elaborate in the underlying article, the fact that indus-
tries develop litigation-avoidance customs does not mean that they 
want those customs to govern when uses of copyrighted works are 
challenged in court.3 Accordingly, the customs themselves are not 
intended to become legal rules, but instead to promote extrajudi-
cial harmony and cost savings over litigating all uses. 
My point is not about whether it is prudent for individual busi-
nesses to license works because of the unpredictability of the fair 
use defense. In the trenches, it may well make sense to license 
rather than to risk litigation, but that is a very different question 
than whether, when one decides to (or must) litigate a particular 
use, those customs should have bearing on the larger normative 
and doctrinal question of whether a fair use has occurred. I con-
 
2 See Epstein, supra note 1, at 209–14. 
3 Rothman, supra note 1, at 1951–53. 
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tend that courts should not use such litigation-avoidance customs 
to establish the scope of fair use.4 The answer in my mind to the 
fair use mess is not to adopt highly restrictive customs and apply 
them. Rather, it is either to reform fair use or for the courts to en-
gage more broadly in the four-factor fair use analysis. 
Epstein suggests that he prefers using custom to determine fair 
use because he worries about the transaction costs of trying to dis-
tinguish between different types of uses of IP.5 Such line-drawing 
problems abound in the law and to abdicate their determination to 
the industry is to entirely repudiate the fair use defense. 
CUSTOM AMONG STRANGERS:  
THE EXAMPLE OF THE FILM INDUSTRY 
Even though Epstein has supported the use of custom to resolve 
contract and tort disputes, he has generally not supported the use 
of custom to bind strangers.6 Our respective definitions of stranger, 
however, are different. In response to my article, Epstein contends 
that the customs involved in licensing copyrighted works for use in 
set dressing for television and movies, in college course packets, 
and for scientific research are all customs that have developed vol-
untarily and among parties who have relationships with one an-
other. As I document in my article and as I have witnessed first-
hand from my time working in the film and television industry, this 
is simply not the case. There are rarely repeat players who are in 
ongoing relationships with each other. Users and owners of IP 
 
4 In part because of the distinction that I make, Epstein’s description of my treat-
ment of individual cases is somewhat misleading. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 
212–13. For example, my critique of American Geophysical v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913 (2d 
Cir. 1994), is not that its holding was wrong per se—I tend to agree that in many in-
stances it should not be fair for a private corporation to make numerous copies of ar-
ticles in lieu of ordering more subscriptions of the relevant journals or licensing copies 
of individual articles. Instead, I criticize the basis for the court’s conclusion. In par-
ticular, I question the court’s reliance on the customary practice, by Texaco and other 
companies, of licensing journal articles. I contend that such licensing customs should 
not have been considered because they were driven by litigation avoidance and were 
not intended to bind parties in potential litigation over fair use. 
5 See Epstein, supra note 1, at 213. 
6 See id. at 208 (contending that “no custom should bind strangers to its formation 
who lose systematically from its application”); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Path 
to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Torts, 21 J. Le-
gal Stud. 1, 4 (1992). 
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rarely have direct involvement with one another. In my article, I 
give the example of a documentary filmmaker who wants to in-
clude posters, postcards, and other images of Elvis Presley that ap-
pear in the bedroom of one of the documentary’s subjects.7 I point 
out that the documentary filmmaker has no ongoing relationship 
with the Elvis estate, and that the Elvis estate is never likely to 
want to license any material from the filmmaker in the future.8 The 
filmmaker and the Elvis estate may loosely speaking both be in the 
same industry—making and selling art—but they can hardly be 
said to have a relationship with one another. 
Under Epstein’s views it seems that anyone involved in a par-
ticular industry is not a stranger to another person in the same in-
dustry even if they have no actual relationship with one another. 
Although I am uncomfortable generally with this approach, it is 
particularly problematic in the IP industries. There is no single in-
dustry involved and virtually every person in the world is a partici-
pant in the copyright markets. Almost everyone has created a 
copyrighted work, and certainly everyone has read, viewed, copied, 
displayed, or commented on such works. To conclude that we are 
not strangers to one another because we are all participants in the 
same copyright markets makes the stranger limitation virtually 
meaningless. 
Perhaps Epstein would define the industries differently, group-
ing together only large film studios so that the custom would bind 
larger production companies, but not independent or documentary 
filmmakers. It is difficult for me to see, however, how BET, a cable 
television network, or HBO, the producers of the relevant televi-
sion show, are less strangers to Ringgold, an independent visual 
artist, than a documentary filmmaker would be.9 Ringgold and 
BET, or HBO for that matter, did not have an ongoing relationship 
and Ringgold’s primary business was not marketing her works to 
the film industry. Instead, the TV show’s set dresser independently 
 
7 I note that in this instance copyrights, publicity rights, and trademarks are at issue. 
8  Rothman, supra note 1, at 1959–61. 
9 In Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997), the de-
fendants hung a poster of Ringgold’s artwork in the background of a television sitcom 
set. Ringgold sued and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the 
district court’s determination that the use was fair primarily because there was an in-
dustry custom to license copyrighted works used in the background of television 
shows and films. 
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and lawfully purchased a poster of Ringgold’s artwork from a third 
party for use in the background of a set used in a TV sitcom. This is 
not an instance of what Epstein terms “institutional arrangements 
to deal with mass transactions.”10 
Epstein notes that he might be more skeptical of the customs if 
there was a more “systematic industry dissatisfaction with the ar-
rangement.”11 In fact, there is much dissatisfaction, as I elaborate in 
my article. Both film studios and television networks, primarily in 
the context of litigation, have criticized the importation of litiga-
tion-avoidance customs to define the scope of fair use when a given 
use is actually contested. Moreover, the industry custom is hardly 
uniform among independent filmmakers and documentary film-
makers. 
REPRESENTATIVENESS AND VALUING DISSENT:  
THE CLASSROOM GUIDELINES 
One of the primary factors that I contend increases the value of 
a custom is whether it developed with the “input and participation 
of both IP owners and users and large and small players in the IP 
industries.”12 When customs develop in a one-sided manner, I con-
tend that they should generally be discounted. One of the primary 
examples I give of such a one-sided custom is the Classroom 
Guidelines, which were developed primarily by publishing compa-
nies to govern educational uses of copyrighted works. Epstein sug-
gests that some universities and libraries were signatories to the 
Guidelines.13 In fact, none were.14 Nor is there any evidence that 
educators or students were involved in the development of the 
Guidelines. The American Association of University Professors 
 
10 Epstein, supra note 1, at 211. 
11 Id. 
12 Rothman, supra note 1, at 1972. 
13 See Epstein, supra note 1, at 211–12 (describing a number of universities as being 
“participants” in the negotiations for the Classroom Guidelines and implying that a 
large number were parties to the “deal”). 
14 See Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educa-
tional 
Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68–70 
(1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681–83; see also Rothman, supra 
note 1, at 1918–19 & n.58. 
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and the American Association of Law Schools even went on record 
as opposing the Guidelines.15 
Despite Epstein’s suggestion that universities and libraries who 
did not agree to the Guidelines should be free to “litigate against 
the norms,”16 the reality is that they cannot. Because courts have 
treated the Guidelines as binding customary agreements, the 
Guidelines have been incorporated into the law. No challenges to 
the Guidelines have been successful despite arguments that univer-
sities and others did not agree to their terms. My main criticism of 
the Classroom Guidelines is not that it was not a good idea to come 
up with some clearly delineated, private safe harbors for educa-
tional copying, but that such guidelines should not lead courts to 
bind parties who did not develop or agree to them. Even parties 
who agree to such guidelines should not be bound by their terms, if 
the understanding was that the guidelines would set a floor, not a 
ceiling, on fair use. 
CONCLUSION 
Epstein and I both agree that the development of copyright cus-
toms is not surprising given the uncertainty about the scope of the 
fair use defense, but we part ways on whether those customs 
should be incorporated into the law. I continue to contend that 
they should not for the reasons I discuss more fully in The Ques-
tionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property. Nevertheless, if the 
customs themselves restrict what gets made, as I claim they do, the 
question remains what can be done to relieve this pressure. Clarify-
ing that customs will not be binding in the courts is one important 
step, but there must also be a movement by IP participants to ex-
plicitly and publicly dissent from the most limiting customs and to 
work toward fixing the fair use system. 
 
 
Preferred citation: Jennifer E. Rothman, Why Custom Cannot Save 
Copyright’s Fair Use Defense, 93 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 243 (2008), 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2008/02/18/rothman.pdf. 
 
15 See Rothman, supra note 1, at 1919 n.61. 
16 Epstein, supra note 1, at 212. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1105829
